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Arlington DPR • Parks & Recreation • Community Data Analysis
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Source: DPR's own slides & March 5 work session transcript
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS • MARCH 2026
DPR's March 5 Slides vs.
The Full Picture
The DPR data behind the Arlington County DPR March 5 Work Session presentation on gymnastics elimination and the Barcroft closure — examined slide by slide.
01
01
Did DPR present the Board the full picture?
02
02
Was this crisis self-inflicted?
03
03
Were all solutions explored?
Swipe to explore
Swipe to explore
🚫 OMITTED DATA SCENARIOS

What If DPR Had Served the Waitlist?

~1,000 enrolled in Barcroft's Winter rec program. ~1,300 more on the waitlist. What if DPR had served that demand and adjusted fees?
Cost Recovery %
Current (DPR)
57%
86% TARGET
57%
+ 25% of waitlist enrolled
70%
~70%
+ 50% of waitlist enrolled
79%
~79%
+ 50% waitlist + 15% fee increase
90%
~90%
+ 50% waitlist + close market rate gap*
109%+
109%+
*Illustrative only. Barcroft rates are ~50% below market. We want rec to stay accessible.
💡
THE BOTTOM LINEDPR's "unsustainable" program is within target range if they simply served the demand that already exists and adjusted fees. The point isn't to match private gym prices — it's that the headroom exists. There are options.
🚫 OMITTED DATA SCENARIOS

What If DPR Had Invested in Coaching?

Revenue scenarios for competitive teams with fee adjustments — using DPR's own historical data from Slide 20
Cost Recovery %
Current: 154 athletes (FY25)
68%
86% TARGET
68%
+ 15% fee increase (families said yes)
79%
~79%
+ Restore FY19 enrollment (197) + fees
84%
~84%
+ FY19 + contract coaching + fees
93%
~93%
+ Community revenue & savings plan
109%+
109%+
Birthday parties Clinics & lessons Camps Sponsorships Rental fees 3 FTE → 1.5
💡
THE BOTTOM LINEUsing DPR's own FY19 data, competitive reaches 95%. Layer in the community's operational plan — birthday parties, clinics, camps, sponsorships, and cutting management from 3 FTEs to 1.5 — and the program doesn’t just survive. It exceeds 100%. There are options. DPR just never explored them. And competitive can’t be isolated from the rest: rec feeds into team, team athletes volunteer for adaptive — these programs are one ecosystem.
📈 DATA PADDING

There Is No Replacement for Barcroft

Arlington County DPR Director Jane Rudolph, representing DPR leadership, presented 13 "alternatives" without answering: How far? Is there capacity? Is it even the same sport?
March 5 Work Session
WATCH: BOARD MEETING — 26:28
DPR presents 13 "alternatives" with no due diligence
DPR Slide 27
SEE WHAT DPR PRESENTED
Slide 27: No drive times. No capacity. No waitlists.
DYNAMIC GYMNASTICS LETTER
Owner Katie Fried: "We cannot absorb even a fraction"
# Facility 1-Way Drive Type Availability What DPR Didn't Tell the Board
★ BARCROFT 0 min FULL PROGRAM 2,000+ Only gym in the region with adaptive, adult, boys & girls competitive, rec, and meet hosting
1 emPOWER Kids 5 min REC ONLY — NO PATHWAY LIMITED No competitive pathway — gymnasts age out with nowhere to advance. Founder coached at Arlington Aerials; built a wellness gym, not a replacement.
2 YMCA Arlington 15 min REC + COMP LIMITED Limited capacity. No boys team. Can't absorb 2,000+ displaced Barcroft families.
3 The Little Gym 20 min REC ONLY — NO PATHWAY LIMITED No competitive pathway — gymnasts age out with nowhere to advance. Max age 12. Scaled-down equipment, no regulation apparatus.
4 Kips Family 22 min REC ONLY — NO PATHWAY LIMITED No competitive pathway — gymnasts age out with nowhere to advance. Has all four apparatus but progression dead-ends at Advanced rec level.
5 Dynamic Gymnastics 25 min REC + COMP WAITLISTED Waitlisted for most classes. Limited rec spots available.
6 Ready Set Gymnastics 35 min REC ONLY — NO PATHWAY PARTIAL WL No competitive pathway — gymnasts age out with nowhere to advance. NoVA location is a church basement. Comp team only in Dunkirk, MD (50 mi).
7 Mosaic Gymnastics 34 min DIFF. SPORT LIMITED Rhythmic gymnastics — different sport, different equipment, different coaching.
8 Cardinal Gymnastics 40 min REC + COMP LIMITED 80-min round trip. No boys team. Limited capacity.
9 Fairfax Gymnastics 38 min REC + COMP LIMITED 76-min round trip. Barely a boys team. Limited capacity.
10 PG County Sports 45 min MARYLAND LIMITED Different state. 90-min round trip through DC traffic.
11 YMCA Bethesda 50 min MARYLAND CAMPS ONLY Different state. Seasonal camps only — not year-round programming.
12 Capital Gymnastics 44 min REC + COMP LIMITED 88-min round trip. Already at capacity. Requires kids to miss school at higher levels.
13 Stafford County 90 min 60 MI AWAY LIMITED 3-hour round trip. DPR actually presented this as an option.
5
Rec Only (No Pathway)
or Wrong Sport
6 of 13
Can't Serve Competitive
2
In Different State
🚗 ~4M
Extra Miles / Year
🌱 1,600
Acres of Forest
Lost in CO₂ / Year
📈
BASIC MARKET RESEARCH FAILUREJane Rudolph presented 13 “alternatives” to the Board without checking whether any had capacity, offered the same programming, or were even the same sport. Every option has limited capacity — none can absorb 2,000+ displaced families. Four are rec-only with no competitive pathway — gymnasts age out with nowhere to advance. One is an entirely different sport. Two are in Maryland. One is a 90-minute drive. And not a single facility replicates what Barcroft offers: rec, competitive, and adaptive gymnastics under one roof — an interconnected ecosystem where rec feeds into team, and team athletes volunteer for adaptive. This isn’t market research — it’s a list designed to make elimination look inevitable.
🌱
CLIMATE IMPACT — CONFLICTS WITH ARLINGTON'S OWN CLIMATE ACTION PLANForcing 2,000+ families to drive to distant facilities adds ~4 million extra vehicle miles per year and ~1,600 tons of CO₂ annually. Per the EPA, that equals the annual carbon absorption of 1,600 acres of U.S. forest — nearly the size of Arlington's entire park system. Arlington County adopted a Climate Action Plan with a carbon neutrality goal, yet Ms. Rudolph's recommendation would erase the equivalent of a county-sized forest's worth of carbon absorption every year.
✂️ DATA STRIPPED OF CONTEXT
Slide 17

"Declining Participation" — Or Declining Service?

March 5 Work Session
WATCH: BOARD MEETING — 18:48
DPR: "declining participation contributing to the program not meeting cost recovery targets"
DPR'S SLIDE
Lists as ongoing challenges:
  • • Recruiting and retention
  • Declining participation
  • • Operational deficits
Implies the community has lost interest in gymnastics.
DPR's Actual Slide:
DPR Slide 17
THE FULL PICTURE
Participation isn't declining. DPR is declining to serve participants. 1,300 on waitlist Ms. Rudolph admitted in the session:
"Since 2022, we've never been fully staffed."— Ms. Rudolph, Arlington County DPR Director
DPR once offered 200–300 rec gymnastics sections per year at Barcroft. Today that number has been cut roughly in half. Fewer sections means fewer enrollment slots, which means lower revenue — and worse cost recovery numbers.

59 classes cancelled in FY25. 51 classes cancelled in FY26. 100+ cancelled in FY22. Each cancellation reduces enrollment, which reduces revenue, which makes cost recovery look worse.

DPR also distorted the relationship between rec and competitive programs. In reality, team coaches also coach rec classes, and rec coaches fill in as subs for team practices — they all work together. Competitive coaching isn’t taking resources from rec; the same coaches support both programs. The staffing crisis is a management failure, not a program design flaw.

These programs are one ecosystem. Rec feeds into competitive. Competitive feeds into adaptive. Roughly 75% of the volunteers for the adaptive program are high-level Tigers and Aerials athletes — the remainder are DPR staff. Eliminating competitive doesn’t just affect team families — it collapses the volunteer pipeline that makes adaptive gymnastics possible.
⚠️
THE BOTTOM LINEThis is a supply crisis driven by DPR's own staffing and retention failures — not a demand problem. The 1,300-person waitlist proves families want the program. Ask the coaches who left why.
🍒 CHERRY-PICKED DATA
Slide 26

The Survey Misdirection

March 5 Work Session
WATCH: BOARD MEETING — 1:14:47
Board member Spain questions the survey — asks for cost comparisons across all programs on the same grid
SURVEY DESIGN FAILURES
8
pages
27
questions
2
mention gymnastics
0
ask about DPR's gymnastics mgmt
25 activities get generic satisfaction scores.
0 questions about DPR’s management, staffing, coaching, or operational decisions.
0 questions about program elimination or cuts.
0 questions about willingness to pay higher fees.
DPR used this broad community interest survey to justify a $969K program elimination — from a question that forced respondents to pick 4 favorites from 25 options.
DPR's Actual Slide:
DPR Slide 26 — Survey Results
THE FULL PICTURE
Out of an 8-page, 27-question survey designed to measure broad community sentiment across all parks and recreation, DPR staff drew a conclusion to eliminate gymnastics. Here's how:

The survey was never designed to evaluate gymnastics. Gymnastics appears in exactly 2 line items out of 27 questions. In the facilities section, it's buried inside "Gyms (basketball, volleyball, gymnastics, pickleball, etc.)" — lumped with sports that share nothing in common with it. In the programs section, it's 1 of 25 options rated on a generic satisfaction scale. No follow-up. No depth. No context.

The "pick your top 4" design guarantees low rankings. Questions 14 and 17 force respondents to choose their 4 most important from lists of 29 facilities and 25 programs. Any specialized program — gymnastics, adaptive sports, teen programs — is structurally guaranteed to rank low against broad categories like "fitness" and "trails." That's survey design, not community preference.

Zero questions about what actually matters. The survey never asks about: competitive vs. recreational programs, coaching quality or staffing, willingness to pay higher fees, waitlist experiences, satisfaction with DPR's management of specific programs, or whether any program should be reduced or eliminated. DPR took the absence of a top-4 ranking and turned it into justification for a $969K elimination.

Two Board members flagged the same problem — this is a budget conversation, and you can't talk about demand without talking about investment:
"Because if you have this demand, a signal from the community, 5% saying they want X... You get what I'm getting?"— JD Spain, Board Member
Board Member Spain Sr. went further, explicitly requesting cost comparisons across programs alongside survey demand percentages — the exact analysis DPR never presented.

The slide header calls this survey "statistically valid" — but no n-value, no respondent count, and no segmentation were presented. We don't know how many people received it, how many responded, or how respondents were selected. You cannot claim statistical validity without disclosing these fundamentals.

The survey also never asks about DPR's management. While 25 activities get generic satisfaction scores, zero questions ask whether residents are satisfied with DPR's staffing, coaching, leadership, or operational decisions for any specific program. DPR's management failures — the staffing crisis, the coaching exodus, the waitlist neglect — are structurally invisible in this survey. You can't hold a department accountable for mismanagement if you never ask about it.

Here's why it matters: a demand signal only means something relative to the investment behind it. If the county spends millions on fitness and aquatics marketing but near-zero promoting gymnastics — then compares survey results side by side — the 5% doesn't reflect demand. It reflects awareness. Underfund a program, don't promote it, then cite low survey interest as proof no one wants it. That's not data — that's a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Look at what else sits at the bottom of the PSMP alongside gymnastics: programs serving youth and community members with disabilities. Ms. Rudolph's implication that low-ranking PSMP categories don't warrant support puts some of the county's most vulnerable populations on the chopping block.

Separately, the FY2027 Budget Survey excluded gymnastics entirely — residents were never even asked whether these programs should be cut. That's what our FOIA request is investigating.

⚠️
THE BOTTOM LINEOut of 8 pages and 27 questions, gymnastics appears in 2 line items — yet DPR used this survey to justify eliminating a $969K program with 5,100+ petition signatures and a 1,300-person waitlist.
🍒🍒🍒 TRIPLE CHERRY-PICKED DATA
Slide 25

Space Usage: Cherry-Picked Hours & Locations

March 5 Work Session
WATCH: BOARD MEETING — 24:57
DPR: "There are gaps throughout the day when Barcroft is not heavily used" — measured only during off-peak hours
DPR'S SLIDE
Shows Barcroft usage by timeslot but splits Gym 1 and Gym 2 separately, artificially deflating per-room numbers. Does not include the fitness center, wellness studio, or boxing room. Compares unfavorably to Lubber Run.

Frames gymnastics equipment as "restricting flexibility" and making the space "difficult to use for other community activities."

Conclusion: facility underutilized.
DPR's Actual Slide:
DPR Slide 25
THE FULL PICTURE
Cherry-Pick #1: Gym 1 & Gym 2 Split Apart
DPR separated Gym 1 and Gym 2 in their analysis, but teams and rec classes flow between both gyms — splitting them makes no sense and artificially deflates the numbers.
Cherry-Pick #2: Three Rooms Excluded
DPR listed both Gym 1 and Gym 2 but did not include the fitness center, wellness studio, or boxing room at all. Usage data for those three rooms was never reported — including them would push Barcroft’s numbers significantly higher.
Cherry-Pick #3: Apples-to-Oranges Comparison
DPR compared Barcroft (28,000 sq ft) to Lubber Run (53,165 sq ft) — nearly twice the size. Raw headcounts without normalizing for facility size is misleading by design.
Community analysis using actual Aerials & Tigers registration data from DPR's own system shows the full picture:
BARCROFT GYM 1&2 — ENROLLMENT-BASED USAGE (WINTER 2026)
TuesdaySaturdaySunday
8am–12pm429341
Afternoon339465
4pm–9pm168
TOTAL243187106
VS. LUBBER RUN (DPR'S OWN COMPARISON)
TuesdaySaturdaySunday
Lubber Run345180144
Barcroft Gym243187 ▲106
Saturday: Barcroft EXCEEDS Lubber Run — 187 vs 180
Critical: These numbers count only Gym 1&2. DPR did not report usage for the fitness center, wellness studio, or boxing room at all. Including those three rooms would push Barcroft usage significantly higher.

DPR split Gym 1 and Gym 2 into separate line items instead of reporting combined usage. Teams and rec flow between both gyms — separating them creates an artificially low picture.

And the comparison is apples to oranges: Barcroft is 28,000 sq ft while Lubber Run is 53,165 sq ft — nearly twice the size. Raw headcounts without normalizing for facility size is misleading by design.

Calling gymnastics equipment a limitation is like saying basketball hoops restrict a gym's flexibility. The equipment IS the program.
⚠️
THE BOTTOM LINEDPR split the two gyms apart, excluded three other rooms entirely, and compared to a facility nearly twice the size — then concluded Barcroft is underutilized. The enrollment data above comes from DPR’s own registration system — data DPR has full access to. Why was a different source chosen that told a different story? This is another question of data integrity in information presented to the Board.
✂️ DATA STRIPPED OF CONTEXT
Slide 23

How Rec Revenue Fell From $1.08M to $528K

March 5 Work Session
WATCH: BOARD MEETING — 22:33
DPR admits: "In FY25, we canceled 59 classes. In FY26, 51 classes — because we did not have instructors"
DPR'S SLIDE
FY25: 57% cost recovery $527K rev / $931K exp Shows a collapse from 156% cost recovery in FY16 to 57% in FY25. Participation dropped from 3,746 (FY19) to 1,866 (FY25).

Gap: $403,338
DPR's Actual Slide:
DPR Slide 23
THE FULL PICTURE
The cost recovery collapse tracks exactly with DPR's staffing crisis:
  • Offer fewer sections (from 200–300/year down to roughly half) → fewer enrollment slots
  • Can't hire instructors → cancel even more classes
  • Cancel classes → fewer enrollments
  • Fewer enrollments → less revenue
  • Less revenue → worse cost recovery
  • Worse cost recovery → "see, it's failing"
Meanwhile, Arlington rec fees are ~50% of private market rate. There's enormous room for fee increases while remaining affordable.

Classes run 5-6 kids with 2-3 coaches. USA Gymnastics allows 6:1 (preschool) and 8:1 (school-age). Efficient scheduling alone could dramatically increase capacity.
⚠️
THE BOTTOM LINEDPR didn't just fail to fix the revenue problem — DPR IS the revenue problem. A workplace culture that couldn't retain coaches created the cost recovery collapse.
✂️ DATA STRIPPED OF CONTEXT
Slides 15, 20 & 23

No Transparency on Cost or Revenue

March 5 Work Session
WATCH: BOARD MEETING — 1:08:52
Coffey asks how DPR got to the $969K — Rudolph redirects to irrelevant slides
DPR'S SLIDE
Repurposing Barcroft saves: $969,542 Presented as a single line item on Slide 15 — expense reduction of $2.29M offset by $1.32M revenue loss.
DPR's Actual Slide:
DPR Slide 15
THE FULL PICTURE
The budget numbers were confusing by design. DPR spread financials across three slides mixing FY25 and FY27 figures — with FY26 completely omitted. Arlington's fiscal year ends June 30 — at the time of this presentation, the county was 8 months into FY26 with budget actuals readily available. Yet DPR skipped the current year entirely and jumped straight to FY27 projections. No single slide showed how the $969K was built.

During the work session, Board Member Maureen Coffey asked Ms. Rudolph to explain how DPR arrived at the $2.3M in expenses and $1.3M in revenue shown on Slide 15 that produced the $969K figure. Ms. Rudolph did not answer the question. Instead, she redirected Coffey to Slides 20 and 23 — which only contain data from FY16–FY25 and have zero relevance to the FY27 projections Coffey was asking about.

Coffey, recognizing the numbers didn't add up, stated: “I will dive deeper when we're not doing live math.”

FY27 Proposed Budget: 13.00 (F) & 3.00 (V) Permanent FTEs / 6.75 (F) Temporary FTEs
Source: FY27 Proposed Budget — County Manager Mark Schwartz
Meanwhile, DPR's own detailed slides tell a different story: $715,467 Competitive gap: $312,129 (Slide 20)
Rec gap: $403,338 (Slide 23)

Where is the missing $254,075? This isn't a rounding error — it's 26% of the claimed savings, unaccounted for in the very slides DPR presented to the Board.

Ms. Rudolph directed a Board member to slides that couldn't answer her question. The $969K figure — the entire basis for eliminating gymnastics — was never explained to the Board.
⚠️
THE BOTTOM LINEWhen Board Member Coffey pressed for the numbers behind the $969K figure, Jane Rudolph redirected her to slides showing FY16–FY25 data — none of which explained the FY27 projection. A $254K gap between the slides and the claimed savings remains unreconciled. The $969K figure — the entire basis for eliminating gymnastics — was never explained to the Board.
✂️ DATA STRIPPED OF CONTEXT
Slides 18 & 19

The Cost Recovery Paradox

March 5 Work Session
WATCH: BOARD MEETING — 19:22
DPR explains the cost recovery "pyramid" — the methodology they admit fluctuates "sometimes significantly"
DPR'S SLIDE
Competitive gymnastics targets 86–100% cost recovery (Level 4 on pyramid: "mostly individual benefit").

Methodology includes personnel, projected participation, program hours, overhead.

Does NOT include facility costs or booster association fees.
DPR Slide 18 DPR Slide 19
THE FULL PICTURE
Ms. Rudolph herself admitted:
"We recognize that it's time to take a fresh look at our cost recovery model to determine whether the methodology... [is] still appropriate."— Ms. Rudolph, during the March 5 work session
You can't use a model you've admitted is broken to justify a $969K decision.

The pyramid also misclassifies competitive gymnastics. It treats it identically to adult fitness memberships — ignoring that competitive teams feed rec enrollment, supply coaching staff, and build the community that produced 5,000+ petition signatures. The cost recovery model evaluates each program in isolation, but these programs function as one ecosystem: rec feeds into competitive, and roughly 75% of the adaptive program’s volunteers are high-level Tigers and Aerials athletes. You can’t measure the value of competitive without accounting for what it makes possible.

Rec gymnastics is also misclassified. DPR placed it at Level 4 ("mostly individual benefit," 86–100% target), but by the county's own definitions, rec gymnastics fits Level 3 — programs with shared community and individual benefit — which carries a lower cost recovery target. Reclassifying rec to Level 3 immediately changes the math on the entire "deficit."

Years ago, DPR committed to outlining separate fee structures for the boys and girls competitive programs. They still haven't done it. This pattern of incomplete follow-through has compounded year over year — and now the Board is being asked to make a permanent decision based on data shaped by that neglect.
MARKET RATE HEADROOM
Barcroft rec gymnastics rates are roughly 50% below private market rates. This gap alone shows significant cost recovery headroom — even a modest adjustment narrows the deficit substantially.
For illustrative purposes only. We want rec gymnastics to remain accessible for the whole community.
⚠️
THE BOTTOM LINEDPR is citing a ruler it admits is broken. The Board deserves a credible methodology before making this decision.
🚫 OMITTED DATA SCENARIOS
Slide 20

Competitive Teams: The 15% Fix

March 5 Work Session
WATCH: BOARD MEETING — 20:39
DPR: "competitive gymnastics cost recovery rates have consistently been below the 86 to 100% target"
DPR'S SLIDE
FY25: 68% cost recovery $672K rev / $984K exp Shows a decade of cost recovery consistently below the 86% target. Frames competitive gymnastics as financially unsustainable.

Gap: $312,129
DPR's Actual Slide:
DPR Slide 20
THE FULL PICTURE
AAPA/ATPA project FY26 revenue at ~$725K, putting cost recovery at ~74%.
A 15% fee increase reaches 85% cost recovery.
Competitive families have publicly stated they will accept this.
DPR never asked families if they'd pay more. Never communicated cost recovery goals. Never floated ideas. Never conducted any outreach to the community about these programs. Last discussion with AAPA was 2+ years ago.

How many DPR programs have constituents volunteering to pay more?
⚠️
THE BOTTOM LINEDPR chose elimination without ever testing the simplest solution: asking families to pay more. They said yes before anyone asked.
Summary of findings

The Anatomy of DPR's March 5 Presentation

Every claim below is sourced directly from DPR's own slides, transcript, and the FY27 proposed budget.
Slide Issue What DPR Presented What the Data Actually Shows Tag
15, 20 & 23 $969K Budget Impact Eliminating gymnastics saves $969,542 Slides total $715K — $254K gap unreconciled. Rudolph redirected Board to irrelevant FY16–25 slides instead of answering. ⚠️ No Transparency
17 Declining Participation Participation fell from 3,746 to 1,866 Sections offered cut from 200–300/yr to roughly half. DPR canceled 59 classes (FY25) and 51 (FY26) due to staffing failures. Supply crisis, not demand. 🍒 Cherry-Picked
18 & 19 Cost Recovery Model Gymnastics fails 86% cost recovery target DPR admitted the cost recovery model needs a “fresh look.” Using a broken ruler to justify a $969K decision. ✂️ Stripped of Context
20 Competitive Teams $312K competitive gap is unsustainable A 15% fee increase closes the gap to 85%. Families already said yes. DPR never asked. 🚫 Omitted Scenarios
23 Rec Cost Recovery Rec revenue collapsed: $1.08M to $528K DPR’s staffing failures caused the collapse. With 25% enrollment growth and 15% fee increase: 76% recovery. ✂️ Stripped of Context
25 Space Usage Gym 1 & 2 split apart. Three other rooms excluded entirely. Registration data: 243 on Tuesdays, 168 evenings alone. Saturday exceeds Lubber Run. Excludes 3 other rooms. 🍒🍒🍒 Triple Cherry-Pick
26 PSMP Survey Only 5% of survey respondents chose gymnastics 27-question general interest survey. Gymnastics in 2 line items. Never asked about fees, coaching, or cuts. 🍒 Cherry-Picked
27 13 “Alternatives” 13 facilities listed as options for displaced families All have limited capacity. 4 are rec-only with no competitive pathway (gymnasts age out). 1 wrong sport. 2 in different state. None can absorb 2,000+ families. 📈 Data Padding
Waitlist & Scenarios No scenario modeling presented 1,300-person waitlist never modeled. Fee increases, community ops, birthday parties, camps — all ignored. 🚫 Omitted Scenarios
01
Did DPR present the Board the full picture?
The March 5 presentation split gym usage data and excluded three rooms entirely, listed "options" in different states and wrong sports, cited a 5% PSMP survey result without comparing investment per program, compared facilities without normalizing for size, and left a $254K math gap unreconciled.

Cherry-picked data. Stripped context. Data padding. Omitted alternatives. Any one alone warrants scrutiny. Together, they form a pattern of systematic data distortion — not analysis ready for the Board’s $969K decision.
02
Was this crisis self-inflicted?
Staffing failures led to class cancellations. Cancellations reduced enrollment. Enrollment drops killed revenue. Revenue declines tanked cost recovery. Now DPR points to cost recovery to justify elimination.

The waitlist of 1,300 people proves the demand is real. The problem was never the market — it was management. Coaches and staff have their own stories about why they left.

And the damage doesn’t stop at one program. Rec, competitive, and adaptive gymnastics are one ecosystem. Roughly 75% of the adaptive program’s volunteers are high-level Tigers and Aerials athletes. Collapse one part and the whole system falls.
03
Were all solutions explored?
15% fee increase — families already said yes. Waitlist conversion — revenue sitting on the table. Outsourced coaching — other DPR programs use this model. Break-session programming — camps, clinics, birthday parties. Adult classes during underutilized daytime hours.

DPR went straight to elimination without exhausting a single alternative. There was no outreach to the community. No ideas were floated. No conversations were had. The first time families learned their programs were at risk was when the budget was published.

What We're Asking the Board

Before voting to eliminate Arlington's most in-demand program, we ask the Board to consider:
1
Flag the analysis.
The data behind the $969K decision doesn't hold up to scrutiny.
The March 5 presentation split gym usage data and excluded three rooms entirely, listed "options" in different states and wrong sports, cited a 5% PSMP survey result without comparing investment per program, compared facilities without normalizing for size, and left a $254K math gap unreconciled. Any one of these alone warrants scrutiny. Together, they indicate analysis that is not ready for a $969K decision.
2
Remember the track record.
DPR made the same promises in 2017. The community is still waiting.
In 2017, the county spent $3.54M expanding Barcroft to meet "overwhelming demand" — while simultaneously displacing Dynamic Gymnastics from the Buck Property (1425 N. Quincy St) with a promise the site would be offline for roughly one year. The county said it would tear the building down and redevelop the site — eight years later, the building is still standing and the site is still sitting there. Eight years later, that site is a bus parking lot. The same DPR leadership — including Director Jane Rudolph — oversaw that broken promise. Now, the FY2027 proposal uses nearly identical language: Barcroft will close "for at least one year" and be "repurposed for other operational needs." The community has seen this playbook before — from the same people running it.
3
Keep the doors open.
No closure until every Board data request has been answered.
Keep Barcroft open during the evaluation period. The Board's own data requests haven't been fulfilled — no decision should be made on incomplete answers. Even Board Member Karantonis pushed back on the timeline: "I do feel that 12 months is a very, very long time... We probably don't need 12 months." If the Board itself questions whether a year-long closure is justified, families shouldn't have to accept it as a given.
4
Share the get-backs.
8 unanswered data requests. The public deserves to see the responses.
Board members made 8 data requests on March 5. Ensure DPR satisfactorily responds to each one — then share the answers with the Arlington public so the community can verify the data for themselves.
5
Engage the community.
Co-develop solutions with the families who use the program.
Form a joint working group with families, coaches, and DPR to co-develop solutions — fee increases, staffing models, and partnerships — before decisions are made behind closed doors. Rec, competitive, and adaptive gymnastics are one ecosystem: rec feeds into team, and 75% of the adaptive program’s volunteers are competitive athletes. Any solution must treat these programs as interconnected, not isolated line items.

March 5 Work Session Key Takeaways

What the Board asked, what DPR left out, and what's still unresolved — straight from the transcript.
Cunningham
Requested operating costs for Barcroft, Lubber Run, and Madison — including how debt and capital costs equate.
Left as get-back. DPR said "we would have to get back to you."
Spain Sr.
Asked for cost comparison across programs (gymnastics, bikes, early childhood) alongside survey demand percentages.
Left as get-back. DPR committed to provide "with clear caveats."
Coffey
Requested breakdown of the $969K net tax support — and asked if gymnastics classes could continue through Enjoy even if competitive fades.
Partially answered. DPR offered to "walk through in more detail offline."
Multiple Board Members
Board received emails with "differing views on the facts presented" — data quality concerns flagged but not investigated.
Chair noted it as work item. No formal review of DPR's methodology was conducted.
Spain Sr.
"How many of the 16 FTE and 6.7 temp staff reductions are Arlingtonians?" Plus financial hardship analysis for displaced families.
Left as get-back. Spain Sr. called exploration of alternatives "prudent."
Chair de Ferranti
Adaptive/movement classes for people with disabilities — if Barcroft closes, what equipment and alternatives are available?
DPR acknowledged "not all equipment would be available." Promised to consult therapeutic rec team.
Cunningham
Cost recovery numbers for 55+ programs by individual program breakdown, and Longbridge demographics (age, fee reduction, zip).
Both left as get-backs. "If it's easy to do for all of them that'd be great."
Coffey
Asked what the program would look like if returned to one gym instead of both — a middle-ground option.
Left as future work. No analysis of partial-service scenarios was presented.
5
Left as Get-Backs
3
Partial / Incomplete
0
Fully Resolved
1 / 17
×
Rec Waitlist Model — The Math
What happens when DPR serves existing demand instead of ignoring it?
Scenario Enrolled Revenue Expenses Cost Recovery
Current (DPR FY25) ~1,000 $527K $931K 57%
+ 25% of waitlist (325) ~1,325 ~$670K ~$958K ~70%
+ 50% of waitlist (650) ~1,650 ~$775K ~$985K ~79%
+ 50% waitlist + 15% fee increase ~1,650 ~$890K ~$985K ~90%
+ 50% waitlist + close market rate gap ~1,650 ~$1,070K ~$985K 109%+
Data sources: Enrollment and expense figures from DPR Slide 23 (FY25 rec data: $527K revenue / $931K expenses). Waitlist of ~1,300 from DPR's own records. Revenue projections assume current per-participant rate applied to additional enrollees. Fee increase scenario applies 15% across the board. Market rate comparison based on survey of private facilities in the region (Barcroft rates are ~50% below market).

Coaching cost assumptions: Additional part-time coaching hours at $20/hr, 50-min classes, 8:1 student-to-coach ratio (USA Gymnastics school-age maximum), 40 weeks/year. This adds ~$27K for 325 students or ~$54K for 650 students. FY25 expenses already include 3 FTE staffing overhead. DPR admitted they have “never been fully staffed” since 2022 and cancelled 59 classes in FY25 alone — meaning the expense baseline already includes budgeted positions that went unfilled. The true incremental cost may be lower.
Competitive Coaching Model — The Math
Using DPR's own historical data from Slide 20
Scenario Athletes Revenue Expenses Cost Recovery
Current FY25 154 $672K $984K 68%
+ 15% fee increase 154 ~$773K $984K ~79%
+ Restore FY19 enrollment + fees 197 ~$847K ~$1,007K ~84%
+ FY19 + contract coaching + fees 197 ~$935K ~$1,007K ~93%
+ Community revenue & savings plan 197+ ~$1,100K+ ~$1,007K 109%+
COMMUNITY PLAN REVENUE SOURCES
Birthday parties • Clinics & private lessons • Summer/break camps • Sponsorships • Facility rental fees • Staffing: 3 FTE → 1.5 FTE (management reduction)
Data sources: FY25 competitive data from DPR Slide 20 ($672K revenue / $984K expenses / 154 athletes). FY19 peak enrollment (197 athletes) from DPR historical records. 15% fee increase based on AAPA/ATPA commitment — families publicly stated willingness to pay. Contract coaching savings based on industry benchmarks for outsourced instruction. Community revenue estimates from AAPA/ATPA operational improvement plan submitted to the Board.

Coaching cost assumptions: Additional part-time coaching hours at $20/hr, 50-min sessions, 6:1 athlete-to-coach ratio, 4 practices/week, 48 weeks/year. Restoring to FY19 enrollment (+43 athletes) adds ~$23K in coaching costs. FY25 expenses already include 3 FTE staffing overhead. DPR admitted they have “never been fully staffed” since 2022 — the expense baseline already includes budgeted positions that went unfilled. The true incremental cost may be lower.
The Survey That's Driving a $969K Decision
2026 Arlington County Community Interest and Opinion Survey — 8 pages, 27 questions
All 8 pages of the 2026 PSMP Community Survey
Click to enlarge — all 8 pages of the survey
What this survey actually asks:
Pages Qs Topic Gymnastics Mention
1 Q1–Q5 Household size, park visits, travel willingness, travel modes to 13 facility types None
2 Q6–Q9 14 participation activities, neighboring jurisdictions, 15 barriers to access, top 3 barriers None
3 Q10–Q12 10 information sources, top 3 sources, 14 barriers to engagement None
4 Q13–Q15 28 facilities satisfaction, pick top 4 of 29 facilities, teen in household 1 mention — buried in "Gyms (basketball, volleyball, gymnastics, pickleball)"
5 Q14 dropdown expanded (29 facility options) Same item
6 Q16–Q18 25 programs satisfaction, pick top 4 of 25 programs, open comments 1 mention — "Gymnastics" (item 11 of 25)
7 Q17 dropdown expanded (25 program options) Same item
8 Q19–Q27 Demographics: age, years in Arlington, race, home, gender, accessibility, language None
HIDING MANAGEMENT FAILURES
While 25 activities get generic satisfaction scores in Q16, zero questions in the entire survey ask whether residents are satisfied with DPR's management, staffing, coaching, or operational decisions for any specific program. The staffing crisis that caused class cancellations, the coaching exodus, the 1,300-person waitlist that was never served — all structurally invisible. You can't hold a department accountable for mismanagement if the survey never asks about it.
What this survey never asks:
Missing Question Why It Matters
Satisfaction with DPR's management of specific programs 25 activities get satisfaction scores, but zero questions about DPR's staffing, coaching, or leadership of any program
Competitive vs. recreational program needs DPR is eliminating both — survey treats them as one
Willingness to pay higher fees Families already said yes to 15% — survey never asked
Waitlist experiences 1,300-person waitlist invisible in survey data
Whether any program should be reduced or eliminated No respondent was ever asked if gymnastics should be cut
Coaching quality or staffing adequacy Root cause of the crisis — never measured
Program-specific investment or awareness 5% reflects awareness of an underfunded program, not demand
THE PREDETERMINED CONCLUSION
DPR used a broad community interest survey — designed to measure general parks and rec sentiment — to justify eliminating a specific program. The "pick your top 4" format structurally buries any specialized program. The survey never asked about management quality, fees, coaching, waitlists, or program cuts. It measured the outcome of DPR's neglect and presented it as community preference. Underfund a program, understaff it, don't promote it — then cite low survey interest as proof no one wants it. That's not data. That's a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Source: 2026 Arlington County Community Interest and Opinion Survey (PSMP), administered by Arlington County DPR. Full survey screenshots captured March 2026. N-value, response rate, and respondent selection methodology were not disclosed by DPR in their March 5 presentation despite claiming results were "statistically valid."